In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of policy measures adopted by Chile 
INTRODUCTION
The excessive liquidity in international capital markets during the 1990s posed several challenges to policy makers in emerging economies. Among numerous issues, the links between financial volatility and short-term capital flows, even if the direction of causality between the two is not always clear-cut, were a particular source of concern. In addition, problems associated with moral hazard, fragility in financial intermediaries' and corporate balance sheets, asset price bubbles, consumption booms and real exchange rate overvaluation were intimately connected to the boom-bust cycle in international capital flows to developing countries following the financial liberalisation process.
In this context, it became evident that full capital account openness can be associated with increased macroeconomic volatility and limitations in degrees of freedom for domestic policy makers, particularly when capital flows are strongly pro-cyclical.
These facts prompted a number of countries to (re)-adopt capital account regulations. In fact, the experience of developing economies with the adoption of capital controls (on inflows, outflows or both) in the last 15 years is diverse (see Ariyoshi et al., 2000) . Our interest at present lies in examining the imposition of price-based capital account management polices in Chile and Colombia since the early 1990s. The aims of those regulations included reducing the costs of sterilisation policies and the appreciation of the real exchange rate associated with large capital inflows and increasing the autonomy of domestic monetary policy. This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of those regulations in attaining some of these goals. In particular, we will concentrate on the effects of the reserve requirements on capital flows and on the real exchange rate. This task presents several difficulties. Cordella (2003) argues that those "taxes" on inflows may either increase or decrease the supply of flows depending on two counteracting forces. On the one hand, if those policies are successful in changing the composition of external liabilities and in reducing the vulnerability to crises, they could in fact generate larger long-term capital inflows, since risk-adjusted yields may increase. On the other hand, the direct decrease in returns from investing in the country (due to the tax) and the increase in the irreversibility of the investment have a negative impact on some of the components of capital inflows.
We will analyse creditor-based data at a monthly frequency that has not been used previously to evaluate the capital account regulations in Chile and Colombia. There are two main advantages in using this dataset. Firstly, the capital flows recorded are arguably less likely to be subject to evasion or re-labelling than official data from the respective central banks. The reserve requirements were imposed on the borrower's part of the transaction, hence it might be the case that there were less incentives for lenders to incorrectly report the nature of the capital account transaction with the objective of evading the controls. In addition, as far as Colombia is concerned, the official statistics on capital flows from the Balanza Cambiaria do not discriminate between flows of different maturities. Our data allows for a direct analysis of the effect of capital account regulations on the maturity structure of flows, which has proved to be difficult in the past.
In any case, the analysis of a different dataset might prove to be a useful exercise in comparison with the previous literature on the subject. Nonetheless, a major drawback is that the data only encompasses capital flows from and to the United States.
The paper is divided into 2 sections. After discussing the macroeconomic environment that prevailed in Chile during the 1990s and describing the dataset used, we present, in the first section, evidence from Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) regressions and Vector Error Correction models (VECM) in order to assess the effects of the price-based capital controls on capital flows and on the real exchange rate.
Subsequently, we proceed to the discussion of the Colombian macroeconomic environment in the 1990s, in the second section, and consider Vector Error Correction and GMM models to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls in affecting capital flows and the real exchange rate in this country.
I CAPITAL CONTROLS IN CHILE
The restoration of democracy in 1990 probably marked the start of the period of greatest prosperity in Chilean history. Chile's macroeconomic performance and stable environment led the country to be granted an investment grade status by the rating agency Standard & Poor's in 1992. In fact, it is necessary to place the Chilean price-based capital controls in a wider context. They were an integral part of a macroeconomic policy strategy that allowed Chilean authorities to sustain the crawling band exchange rate regime and target interest rates to stabilise domestic prices, whilst reducing the excessive pressure that those high interest rates put on the exchange rate.
The Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) on capital inflows was imposed in June 1991 at a rate of 20% with the objective of coping with the "mixed blessings" of large capital inflows and the associated pressures towards real exchange rate appreciation and unsustainable bubbles in credit and asset markets. This market-based policy acted as an "asymmetric tax" (falling more heavily on short-term capital inflows) and it was accompanied by other prudential measures (such as size limits on foreign bond issues by domestic intermediaries) and an extensive liberalisation of capital outflows. Laban & Larrain (2000) argue that the liberalisation of outflows might encourage further capital inflows due to the reduction in the irreversibility of investing in the country.
Nevertheless, it could also facilitate "runs" in bad times, which effectively occurred when domestic pension funds were responsible for large capital outflows in 1998. In any case, given the pro-cyclicality of capital flows, the latter effect seems to outweigh the former one.
In May and July 1992, important modifications were made to the system, in combination with changes in the exchange rate regime, most notably, a move towards a basket peg, with the objective of facing the increasing pressures posed by large inflows on the economy. The reserve requirement was raised to 30% and the holding period was fixed at one year, irrespective of the maturity of the credit. In addition, the coverage of the deposit requirements was extended.
As has been emphasised by several authors, the private sector was constantly looking for ways to circumvent the controls (De Gregorio et al., 2000) , whilst the central bank authorities tried to close loopholes. In mid-1995, for instance, the controls were extended, especially to secondary market ADRs and portfolio flows in order to close loopholes and make the regulations more restrictive i .
In 1998, in the midst of the turmoil caused by the difficulties in Russia, the unremunerated reserve requirement was reduced to 10% and, in September of that year, it was finally set to zero. Subsequently, in June 2001, the Chilean authorities decided to abolish the controls on inflows altogether and, during the negotiations leading to trade agreements with the U.S., pressures to abandon capital controls imposed strict limits on their use in the future.
In addition to the URR, after 1992, Chile imposed minimum stay requirements of one year to FDI and portfolio flows (those requirements were lifted in May 2000). Other capital account restrictions included minimum solvency requirements on domestic issuers of foreign liabilities (bonds and ADRs) and size requirements on issues of foreign liabilities by corporations and banks.
I.I A Brief Survey of the Econometric Literature on the Chilean Controls
Nadal de Simone & Sorsa (1999) provided an extensive review of the early econometric work on the effects of the unremunerated reserve requirements on capital flows. The studies considered by those authors presented some evidence that the URR was capable of altering the composition of capital flows towards long-term flows, but there was only mixed evidence that the URR has affected the level of total flows.
Nonetheless, the econometric methodology used in most cases suffered from several shortcomings. Misspecification problems abounded (evidence of heterocedasticity, serial correlation, non-normality of the residuals, etc.) and a variety of authors failed to test for the non-stationarity of variables included in the regressions and for co-integration.
Another relevant point relates to the fact that, since the deposits were made in foreign currency, the financial cost of the URR was somewhat reduced by the appreciation of the exchange rate during the period, nonetheless most studies fail to account for this effect of movements in the exchange rate.
Edwards (1999) estimated a series of unrestricted VAR models, using quarterly data, and he concluded that the restrictions on capital flows had been unsuccessful in reducing the real exchange rate appreciation. However, the impulse response functions estimated showed that the Chilean authorities were able to gain a greater control over interest rates in the short-run after the imposition of the capital controls.
De Gregorio et al. (2000) attempted to measure the effect of the Chilean controls on the volume and composition of capital flows, on interest rates and on the real exchange rate using two methodologies. Firstly, they used an instrumental variables technique in order to estimate reduced-form equations for capital inflows as a proportion of GDP. Subsequently, they considered VAR systems, using monthly data on real capital inflows. They found that the URR had large and significant negative effects on short-term inflows; nevertheless, it also had a positive effect on long-term inflows (and overall no effect on total flows). Their impulse response functions indicated that the URR allowed the monetary authorities to target interest rates, whilst maintaining a wedge between domestic and foreign rates in the short-run, but they only had transitory effects on the real exchange rate.
Le fort & Lehman (2000) have estimated a co-integration model for capital flows, including variables that refer to the supply of foreign capital, the development of the domestic financial system, interest rate differentials and the financial cost of the URR, using quarterly data from the period 1990 to 1997. These authors found that the response of total net and total gross capital inflows to the URR was negative and significantly different from zero and so was the response of net short-term and net long-term flows.
Their methodology has advantages over the simple VAR regressions used in other studies because it tackles non-stationarity issues. Nevertheless, they considered the URR as an exogenous variable, when, in fact, it is likely to respond to capital flows. Furthermore, the sample used is small (only 32 observations), which may bias some of the results. were more financially constrained than larger firms as a consequence of the policy. This conclusion has been confirmed by a study by Gallego & Hernandez (2003) on the microeconomic effects of the controls, which examined the financial statements of 73
Chilean firms from 1986 to 2001. One has to acknowledge that it is evident that the URR had its costs; nonetheless, those studies do not consider that it was precisely the objective of the policy to limit the access to foreign finance (i.e. the exposure) of firms that are more likely to have unhedged foreign currency debt and are more financially fragile (subject to bankruptcy from capital flow reversals or sudden stops). Smaller firms are more likely to fall into those categories.
To sum up, the econometric literature on the capital controls in Chile seems to present rather positive results on the effectiveness of the deposit requirements in terms of reducing short-term inflows and increasing monetary policy autonomy. Nonetheless, the results concerning the effects of capital controls on the real exchange rate and on total capital flows are inconclusive so far. One has to bear in mind that a large number of the models estimated present serious inadequacies and have not been subject to thorough testing procedures.
I.II Dataset Description and Measurement Issues
A large part of the data that we have used in our study can be found at the Central Bank of Chile's website. This is the source for the series on the domestic interest rates, on the nominal exchange rate, on the real exchange rate index and on the trade balance. We constructed the series for the cyclical component of the real exchange rate by fitting a structural time series model to the real exchange rate series (using Kalman filtering techniques). The 90-day U.S. Treasury bill was used to calculate the interest rate differential between Chile and the United States. The country risk premium used in the construction of the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements represents the premium on international bonds issued by Chilean corporations and is based on Central Bank of Chile data. The terms of trade series that we have used was calculated by Bennett & Valdes (2001) and the series on the ratio of government spending to GDP was provided by Gallego et al. (2002) . This data constitutes an alternative creditor-based source that allows us to discriminate between flows of different maturities. In the TIC dataset, long-term securities refer to securities with an original maturity of more than one year. Short-term capital flows compiled in the TIC system include liabilities and claims arising from deposits due to or from foreign entities, financial instruments with an original maturity of one year or less, borrowings from foreigners and loans and other credits to foreigners iii .
Our data on the "Junk Bond" spread, i.e. high yield (non-investment grade) rates paid by U.S. corporations was obtained from Bloomberg and its inclusion in the models is meant to reflect the changes in risk appetite of international investors. The series on the world oil price index (included to capture real shocks) comes from the IMF's IFS database, as does the series on net foreign assets.
A crucial question, when assessing the impact of the price-based regulations on inflows, is the appropriate measurement of the tax-equivalent of the reserve requirement.
The vast majority of the literature adopts a "naïve" measure of this tax, which is constructed by combining an arbitrage condition and the uncovered interest parity equation. Consider the case where the maturity of the loan (capital inflow) is larger than the holding period of the deposit requirement ( ). Assuming that the exchange rate is fixed, the uncovered interest parity would take the form:
Where i is the domestic interest rate, is the international interest rate and * i δ is the tax equivalent of the reserve requirement. The following arbitrage equation is also used:
where is the unremunerated reserve requirement. The above expression simply states that the return from investing in Chile (considering the reserve requirements) has to be equal to the return obtained from investing abroad, i.e. the international interest rate (opportunity cost). Using the UIP condition to substitute for domestic interest rates and using the approximation that for a small
j , we can derive the usual naïve equation for the tax equivalent:
Note that the tax-equivalent is inversely related to the maturity of the capital inflow ( k ), i.e. it falls more heavily on short-term capital inflows iv . This widely used measure of the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements has significant limitations. It does not take the country risk premium into account and does not consider variations in the exchange rate. In our analysis, we will adopt a measure of the tax-equivalent cost that incorporates those factors. Firstly, we will consider the case where the holding period of the deposit ( h ) is equal to the maturity of the loan ( ). The UIP condition at present is given by:
where λ is the country risk premium and ΔS e is the expected change in the exchange rate. The arbitrage condition is given by:
where the term of the left-hand side is the opportunity cost of the investment decision (foreign interest rate plus country and currency risk), the first term on the right-hand side represents the returns on the amount actually invested (i.e. minus the reserve requirements) and the second term represents possible capital gains (or losses) from changes in the exchange rate. By manipulating those two equations we can obtain the following result:
Note that the same formula is valid for the case when the holding period of the deposit requirement is larger than the maturity of the loan, i.e. the case where . This occurs because the arbitrage condition is very similar to the one outlined above, more specifically:
By manipulating this expression we obtain:
Now we will proceed to calculating the tax equivalent when i.e. when the maturity of the investment is larger than the holding period of the reserve requirement. If we assume that the proceeds of the deposit requirement are reinvested abroad, the arbitrage condition becomes:
By manipulating this we obtain:
Evidently, those measures only constitute a proxy for the costs of the reserve requirements and depend on a certain number of restrictive assumptions. In the empirical implementations, we decided to use an average of the tax equivalent variable for different maturities and we experimented with different measures for the expected rate of exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) v .
I.III Empirical Models
The theoretical underpinnings of the regressions applied to Chile are the creditrationing models for the supply and demand for capital flows to developing countries along the lines of Fitzgerald (2002) and Mody & Taylor (2002) . We include lags of capital flows as an explanatory variable with the objective of capturing herding, inertia or bandwagon effects in international capital markets. It is clear that endogeneity problems are very likely to arise in the estimation of equations describing capital flows. In addition, right-hand-side variables are also measured with error.
In this context, it is likely that the residuals of the regression will be correlated with the explanatory variables, which implies that OLS estimates would be biased and inconsistent. We will tackle this problem by estimating regressions using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique. In order to apply this technique, it is necessary to impose orthogonality conditions between the explanatory variables and the error term. In our case the orthogonality conditions will consist of a set of instruments, let's call them Z t , that are assumed to be orthogonal to the error term in our models for capital flows Favero, 2001 ).
When implementing our GMM models we correct for heterocedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form using by Barlett weights to ensure that the variancecovariance matrix estimated is positive definite. In addition, we use the J-statistic obtained from the regressions to test for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions imposed, in order to ensure that the instruments used are adequate.
I.III.I The Effect of the Reserve Requirements on Capital Inflows
The central question that most of the empirical literature on the effects of the reserve requirements attempts to address is their direct effects on net capital inflows. We will try to tackle this issue by estimating log-linear models for capital flows as a function of the interest rate differential, the junk bond spread and the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements. The models are estimated over the period from January 1991 to December 2000. The sample period was chosen to ensure that we use data over a single policy regime (to avoid structural breaks) and because of data availability. The unit root tests for the variables included in the model (presented in the Annex) reveal that most of the series are stationary with the possible exception of net short-term inflows, the terms of trade and the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements.
Hence, we will focus on net total and net long-term capital flows, as those series seem to be the ones for which we can be fairly certain that a unit root is not present and therefore the application of the GMM technique is adequate. Furthermore, following a strand of the literature on capital flows (see Agenor et al. 2002) , we include the interest differential, the junk bond spread and the tax equivalent series in first differences. We justify this choice for two reasons. The first one relates to the need to get rid of unit root problems. In addition, since we are dealing with capital flows, it is intuitive that changes in those series are more relevant than simply looking at the levels.
The results obtained for the regression of net total capital flows to Chile on lags of itself, the interest rate differential, the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements, the Junk Bond spread, a dummy variable that takes the value of one in May, June and July 1992
and zero otherwise and a dummy variable that captures the "aftershock" of the 1998
Russian crisis are presented in Table 1 . The dummy variable for the relevant months in 1992 was included to capture the effects of the profound changes in the capital account regulations that took place in that period. We used lags of net total flows, lags of the reserve requirement, lags of the interest rate differential, lags of the real exchange rate gap, the log of World Oil prices, changes in the log of the terms of trade, the trade balance and lags of changes in the high-yield spread as instruments.
(Insert Table 1 here).
The estimates obtained are autocorrelation and heterocedasticity consistent. The relatively high R-square indicates a good fit. The J-test statistic does not reject the validity of the instruments and non-normality of the residuals is rejected at the 12% level.
Most coefficients are significant at conventional levels, with the exception of the Junk bond spread, and present the expected signs, i.e. the lag capital flows and the interest differential have positive coefficients and the tax equivalent and the dummy variables have negative coefficients. Furthermore, the model suggests that total net capital flows are highly responsive to changes in the URR (in fact, the coefficient seems to be much higher than the ones for all the other variables). The negative coefficient for the dummy variable also indicates that the tightening of the capital account regulations and changes in the exchange rate regime in 1992 reduced net capital flows significantly.
Having established with a certain degree of confidence that the URR did reduce net total capital flows, we are going to examine more closely its effects on the composition of flows. For this purpose, we build a model for net long-term capital inflows to Chile, including the same explanatory variables as before. We have used lags of net long term flows, lags of the tax equivalent and of the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate gap, world oil prices, changes in the terms of trade, the high yield spread and the trade balance as instruments.
(Insert Table 2 here).
Once again, the high R-squared indicates a good fit, the normality of the residuals is rejected at the 7% level, nonetheless this is not very preoccupying since the properties of GMM estimators are asymptotic and do not rely on an underlying normality assumption to obtain the asymptotic normality of the estimator vi . The J-test confirms the validity of the instruments. We found that the URR had no significant effect on net long-term capital flows as the p-value for the coefficient associated with that variable is 0.53, which is not surprising, since those flows were not the main target of the Chilean authorities. All the significant coefficients have the expected signs. One should note the negative coefficient for the 1992 dummy, which indicates that the changes in capital account regulations and the exchange rate regime verified then did reduce long-term flows.
Hence, our results differ from the ones obtained by De Gregorio et al. (2000), who
found that the URR actually increased long-term flows. They also differ from the conclusions reached by Lefort and Lehman (2000) , who found that the URR decreased net long-term capital flows. This could be explained not only by the different dataset and tax equivalent measures used in our regressions, but also by the small sample size in the Le fort and Lehman paper and the fact that both studies are subject to misspecification problems (neither paper presents the relevant tests). In addition, both papers seem to consider measures of long-term capital flows that include FDI, which was actually exempt from the controls, whereas our measure explicitly excludes this type of flows.
I.III.II The Effect of the URR on the Real Exchange Rate
The Chilean authorities were concerned with the excessive appreciation of the real exchange rate that was associated with the surge in capital inflows of the 1990s and one of the objectives of the reserve requirements was to counter this tendency. Apart from the indirect effect of the URR on the real exchange rate through the reduction of capital inflows, one also has to consider the possible impact of the capital controls on expectations about the future exchange rate (and hence on the current exchange rate).
In order to assess the effects of the URR on the real exchange rate, we decided to use the Johansen (1988) Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure to analyse long-run co-integration relationships in a multivariate framework. One has to bear in mind that it is important to estimate the co-integration relationships using data from a single macroeconomic policy regime, since it is very likely that the parameters of the co-integration relationship would be unstable otherwise. One also has to note that there is a serious risk of inconsistency of estimates when the wrong co-integration relationships are imposed, since imposing wrong co-integration parameters will make the system converge to an incorrect equilibrium in the long run and also bias short-run dynamics (Favero, 2001 ).
There are a number of preliminary issues that have to be addressed when using the Johansen procedure for the modelling of long-run relationships. As has been emphasised by Pesaran et al. (2000) , one fundamental problem is to make sure that all the variables that are included in the long-run co-integration relationship(s) are in fact nonstationary. Another crucial step is to model appropriately deterministic components (such as trends and intercepts) and whether to include I(1) and I(0) exogenous variables. In case exogenous variables are included in the model, the usual critical values for cointegration tests have to be changed (the appropriate critical values were tabulated by Pesaran et al. 2000) . The final preliminary problem to be resolved is the selection of the lag-order of the underlying VAR model. Too many lags may lead to overparametrisation and two few to omitted variables and autocorrelation of the residuals.
We estimate a model including the log level of the real exchange rate, the log of the terms of trade, the tax equivalent, the ratio of government spending to GDP and the log of net foreign assets as endogenous variables. We have also included the log of world oil prices and a dummy variable taking the value of 1 after September 1999 to account for the move towards a floating exchange rate regime as exogenous variables. Unit root tests for the variables that were not used previously are presented in the Annex. The tests clearly indicate that the series included are non-stationary, with the possible exception of the terms of trade series.
After visual inspection of the series included, we estimated a model with unrestricted intercept and restricted trends vii , the Akaike information criterion suggests a model with two lags for that specification. The Co-integration tests are presented in Table   3 , both the trace and maximum-eigenvalue statistics indicate only one co-integrating vector involving the variables considered above.
(Insert Table 3 here). where we normalized the coefficient of the real exchange rate to 1 in order to identify the co-integration relationship. We decided to impose restrictions on the coefficients of the co-integration vector and test those sequentially following the procedure suggested by Pesaran et al. (2000) . The coefficient for the tax equivalent of the reserve requirement proved to be insignificant, as evidenced by the Likelihood ratio test (LR test statistic of 0.003 and p-value of 0.96). Hence, it seems that the URR did not have a direct long run effect on the real exchange rate in Chile, i.e. it was not capable of preventing the appreciation of the real exchange in the long run beyond the indirect effect through the reduction in net total capital inflows.
(Insert Table 4 here).
We now examine the short-term dynamics of the model, by specifying an error correction model presented in Table 5 . Note that the error correction term is significant and has the correct sign; its relatively small coefficient suggests a slow adjustment towards equilibrium. The diagnostic statistics are quite good, as there is no evidence of non-normality of the residuals and heterocedasticity. Nonetheless, there is some evidence of serial correlation; therefore, we present Newey-West corrected standard errors.
(Insert Table 5 here).
The results indicate that the tax equivalent also failed to have a direct short-run effect on the real exchange rate. Note that this evidence only refers to direct effects not capturing the indirect effect of the URR on the real exchange rate through the reduction of capital flows. Edwards (1999) , using unrestricted VARs models and quarterly data, also failed to find a significant impact of the URR on the real exchange rate, whereas De Gregorio et al. (2000) found only a transitory effect which dies out after 2 months.
II CAPITAL CONTROLS IN COLOMBIA
The economic liberalisation process in Colombia started in the early 1990s, when severe political and social turmoil precipitated the adoption of "structural" reforms, initially marked by the elimination of most quantitative controls on imports, followed by a gradual but rapid reduction of tariffs and the liberalisation of foreign lending in February 1992. As in the Chilean case, the return of large capital inflows to the country from the early 1990s onwards marked a period of real exchange rate appreciation.
High domestic interest rates in the beginning of the 1990s proved to be incompatible with the prevailing crawling peg exchange rate regime, leading to a rapid accumulation of reserves and a considerable sterilisation effort by the Central Bank. This situation led to the adoption of a complicated Certificados de Cambio regime from June 1991 to February 1994, where exporters and other sellers of foreign exchange were given non-interest yielding dollar denominated debt in place of pesos for their dollars (Williamson, 1996) .
As the accumulation of foreign reserves posed problems for domestic monetary management, the central bank decided to adopt a crawling band exchange rate regime from February 1994. The band-width was set at 7% and the crawling rate was set initially at 11% yearly. The limits of the band changed on several occasions, supposedly to reflect changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and the equilibrium long-run exchange rate.
The pressures towards nominal exchange rate appreciation were less pronounced than in the Chilean case; nonetheless, the nominal exchange rate moved towards the floor of the band on several occasions, particularly between May 1994 and July 1995 and September 1996 and September 1997.
An extensive external financial liberalisation process took place at the beginning of the 1990s in Colombia and a large part of the existing quantitative controls on capital flows was dismantled in this period. The Colombian authorities opted to move towards more flexible, price-based capital account regulations from September 1993, rather than adopting full capital account convertibility or maintaining "old-style" administrative capital controls.
The rationale for the adoption of controls on capital inflows by the Colombian authorities is analogous to the reasons that were put forward by Chilean policy makers.
The reserve requirements and minimum maturities changed frequently over the 1990s; in fact, the Colombian restrictions were far more complex than the Chilean ones and the level of the tax equivalent of the unremunerated deposits was significantly higher. This suggests that the Colombian authorities pursued a more active management policy, as far as the capital account is concerned, when compared to Chile and/or it could reflect the greater relative instability of the Colombian economy and the political strength of the export sector. In addition, the complexity of the capital controls arguably increased uncertainty and speculation, as financial market players attempted to anticipate changes in the regulations.
Initially, a deposit requirement of 47% was applied to all capital inflows of maturity under 18 months for a holding period of 12 months. The controls became more restrictive in March 1994, when all inflows of less than 36 months maturity were subjected to the deposit requirement. The borrowers were given the option to choose the holding period of the deposit and the deposit requirement varied accordingly viii (Cardenas & Barrera, 1997) . In August 1994, the deposit requirements were extended to all foreign loans with a maturity of less than 5 years ix . In March 1996, the controls were relaxed, a deposit requirement of 50% with a holding period of 18 months was imposed on inflows with a maturity of less than 3 years, whereas loans with longer maturities where exempt from the deposit requirements.
From the last quarter of 1996, Colombia experienced a surge in capital inflows, which was in part associated with the privatisation of public utilities. Consequently, in
March 1997, the Colombian authorities decided to tighten the controls once again; all capital inflows with a maturity of less than 5 years were subject to a uniform deposit requirement of 50% for a holding period of 18 months. Furthermore, in May 1997, the government adopted a system more similar to the Chilean one, where all capital inflows were subject to a 30% deposit in Colombian pesos with an 18-month holding period. In September 1998, the deposit rate and holding periods were reduced in response to the crisis in international financial markets. In that month, the central bank of Colombia reduced the deposit requirements on inflows from 25% to 10% and the holding period from 12 to 6 months. Finally, in June 2000, the Banco de la Republica decided to eliminate the reserve requirements on capital inflows.
II.I A Brief Survey of the Literature on the Colombian Controls
The econometric literature on the Colombian capital account regulations has focused its attention on their impact on the level and composition of net capital inflows and, to a smaller extent, on the effect of the regulations on the real exchange rate and domestic interest rates. In addition to the usual technical econometric difficulties in analysing those issues, in the Colombian case, the shortcomings of the empirical analysis are compounded by the lack of appropriate high frequency balance of payments statistics covering the period during which the controls were in place, as we will discuss in detail below.
Cardenas and Barrera (1997), using data from 1985 to 1996, analysed the effectiveness of the controls in terms of their impact on the level and composition of capital flows. They estimated simple OLS regressions for capital flows to Colombia on a proxy of the external environment, interest rate differentials, fundamentals and measures of the tax equivalent of the deposit requirements and found that the URR has been successful in tilting the maturity structure of inflows towards long-term flows, but did not reduce the total volume of capital flows.
These authors emphasised the limitations of official balance of payments data with regard to capital flows and used data from the foreign exchange balance ("balanza cambiaria") published by the Central Bank instead. A major drawback, when using this data, relates to the fact that it is not possible to distinguish between short-term and medium and long-term capital flows and therefore the effects of the URR on the maturity structure of capital flows have to be tested indirectly.
In fact, Cardenas and Barrera inferred the impact of the URR on the maturity composition of flows by estimating separate regressions with capital inflows as the dependent variable, each of them including distinct measures of the interest rate differential, according to the tax-equivalent of the reserve requirement for each maturity,
i.e. they calculated different measures of the interest rate differential for inflows with a maturity of 12, 18, 36 months etc. They argued that, when the coefficient of the interest rate differential is not significantly different from zero, one could conclude that the reserve requirements were not relevant. In this framework, they showed that the coefficients were only significant for short-term flows and concluded that the reserve requirements were ineffective in reducing total capital inflows. This methodology seems rather confusing and it only addresses very indirectly the effect of the reserve on the maturity composition of capital flows (through the interest arbitrage term). Cardenas and Steiner (2000) updated the data set that was used by Cardenas and Barreras and they ran a simple Chow test to determine if the reserve requirements changed the composition of inflows in favour of long-term flows and concluded that the deposit requirements were effective in doing so. Once again, one has to note that neither of these studies presented Unit root tests for the variables used and did not consider possible endogeneity problems, which may invalidate their results. Another important limitation of those studies is that they did not account for regime changes. They included in their sample periods several observations that occurred before financial liberalisation took place in Colombia (1991 onwards). Ocampo and Tovar (1999) used Vector Error-Correction and State-Space models to estimate the effects of the deposit requirements on capital flows. They attempted to estimate private capital flows as a function of the imports of capital goods, an interest rate arbitrage term (which includes the effects of the deposit requirements) and regulations on the capital account. Therefore, there are two different channels through which the restrictions might affect capital flows: through the interest rate differential and through the effects of the dummy variables representing other restrictions on the capital account.
They used monthly data from 1990 to 1998 and found that capital flows x ; interest rate differentials and imports of capital goods are co-integrated. Alternatively, they used the Kalman filter algorithm to estimate the same relationship that was presented previously.
The evidence confirms the results that the price-based controls were effective in reducing the total volume of capital inflows. Rincon (1999) used monthly data from September 1993 to June 1998 on net flows of short-term (less than one year) capital to the private sector from the foreign exchange balance and from the "cuentas de compensacion" in order to assess the effects of the capital controls. After testing the variables for Unit roots and Co-integration, he estimated error-correction models and concluded that the controls were effective in reducing shortterm capital inflows. Rincon & Villar (2000) estimated OLS equations for capital flows using data from the balanza cambiaria as a function of lagged values of domestic and foreign interest rates, the tax equivalent of the unremunerated reserve requirement xi and lagged values of the dependent variable. The coefficient of the URR turned out to be negative and statistically significant.
They also performed an indirect test for the effect of the URR on the real exchange rate, using a single equation co-integration procedure (Engle-Granger) to determine the behaviour of the latter variable. They concluded that, since capital flows affected the behaviour of the real exchange rate, the URR had a significant indirect impact on that variable. Finally, these authors estimated a simple regression for the domestic real interest rate, including the foreign real interest rate and the URR as exogenous variables and found a positive and significant coefficient for the taxequivalent.
We may conclude that, in the Colombian case, there is evidence of the effectiveness of the controls in reducing the total volume of flows. The econometric analysis of the impact of the URR on the maturity structure of flows is hampered by the lack of high frequency data distinguishing short-term from medium and long-term flows.
In fact, most studies (apart from Rincon, 1999) use data on total flows. Nevertheless, as in Chile, there is a relative consensus on the impact of the reserve requirements on the composition of flows (towards improving its maturity structure). Most of the limitations which characterised the econometric analysis of the Chilean case, such as Unit roots, endogeneity and misspecification problems still apply.
II.II Dataset Description and Measurement Issues
Most of the data that we used in our estimations originates from the Banco de la
Republica. As we pointed out previously, the balanza cambiaria does not provide information on the maturity structure of flows, which renders the analysis of the effect of the controls on the maturity of capital flows particularly difficult. Alternatively, we will use data on long-term bond and equity flows as well as data on transactions in short-term securities from and to the United States compiled by the U.S. Treasury Department in its
International Capital Reports, as outlined in previous sections xii .
We employed the nominal interest rate on 90-day certificates of deposits (Certificados de Deposito a Termino, which is the reference rate for the Colombian financial system), the 90-day nominal treasury-bill rate, the country risk premium and the forward nominal exchange rate for the construction of the interest differential series. The series for the sovereign risk premium was constructed by Rincon and Villar (2000) , using the spread of Colombian bonds in international markets over US Treasury bills for a fiveyear maturity since 1995. We extended the series until December 2002 using Colombia's EMBI+ index as calculated by J.P. Morgan.
The real exchange rate series is the one calculated by the Banco de la Republica.
The real exchange rate gap (the cyclical component of the real exchange rate) was obtained by fitting a structural time series model to the real exchange rate data, using the Kalman filter algorithm. Our series on the trade balance and the terms of trade for this country were obtained from Datastream. The series for net foreign assets was obtained from the IMF's international financial statistics and the series on real government spending was obtained at the central bank's website (deflated using the CPI).
The methodology underlying the construction of the tax-equivalent is the same used for the Chilean case. From January 1997 onwards we obtained data for the implicit expected nominal devaluation from forward exchange rate contracts. For the period before that we use different measures including both past and future devaluations.
II.III Empirical Models

II.III.I The Effect of Price-Based Regulations on Capital Flows
Our models will refer to total net capital flows and long-term net capital flows to Colombia. As we can see from the Unit Root tests presented in the Annex, most variables are I(0), with the exception of the short-term capital flows series and the tax equivalent series. Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of the model for total net capital flows to Colombia for the period from January 1993 to December 2000 xiii . We regressed net total capital flows on lags of itself, the interest rate differential, the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements, the high yield spread and a dummy variable taking the value of zero before September 1999 and 1 thereafter xiv . Furthermore, we included lags of net capital flows, lags of the interest differential, lags of the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements, lags of the real exchange rate gap, lags of the high-yield spread, world oil prices and lags of the trade balance as instruments.
(Insert Table 6 here).
The R-square indicates a relatively good fit, the J-test does not reject the validity of the instruments; nonetheless, there is evidence of non-normality of the residuals (as we argued before, this is not preoccupying in the GMM framework). The coefficients for the lagged capital flows and the dummy variable are significant and they have the expected signs. The coefficient for the interest rate differential is not significant, nor is the coefficient for the Junk bond spread. As in the Chilean case, the model suggests that total net capital flows were reduced by the reserve requirements, since the URR term presents a negative and highly significant coefficient.
We now proceed to the estimation of the model for net long-term capital inflows to Colombia. We used the lagged level of long-term capital flows, the interest rate differential, the tax equivalent, the Junk bond spread and the dummy variable as explanatory variables. Lags of the long-term net inflows, lags of the tax equivalent, lags of the interest rate differential, lags of the real exchange rate gap, lags of the Junk bond spread, lags of the trade balance and world oil prices were used as instruments.
The results are presented in Table 7 . The J-test does not reject the validity of the instruments used. Note that the coefficient for lag capital flows is significant, as is the coefficient for tax equivalent, which also has the expected negative sign. In addition, the URR coefficient in this equation is of approximately the same size as the URR coefficient in the equation for total net capital flows. It is also of interest to note that the interest rate differential term does not seem to help to explain long-term capital flows to Colombia.
(Insert Table 7 here).
Hence, we may conclude that, contrary to the Chilean case, the Colombian controls on capital inflows did have an effect on long-term capital flows as well as an effect on short-term flows. This can arguably be explained by the fact that the Colombian "tax rates" were much higher than the Chilean ones and they also applied to mediumterm flows. In fact, one has to bear in mind that our dataset classifies capital flows as long-term when their maturity exceeds 1 year. Nonetheless, at several points in time, the Colombian authorities imposed high reserve requirements on capital inflows with maturities of 1.5 to 2 years, which would be classified as long-term flows in our data.
II.III.II The Reserve Requirements and the Real Exchange Rate
Similarly to the case of Chile in the 1990s, the surge in capital inflows to the Colombian economy was accompanied by a tendency towards the appreciation of the real exchange rate with damaging effects in terms of competitiveness of exports and vulnerability to currency crises. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that one of the objectives of the Colombian policy makers, when adopting the reserve requirements, was to counter a possible excessive overvaluation of the real exchange rate.
In this section, we use the Johansen procedure once again to analyse a model of equilibrium real exchange rate determination, including the log of the terms of trade, the log of net foreign assets and the log of real government expenditures. We then test for the direct impact of the URR on the real exchange rate rather than following the indirect approach outlined previously. All the new variables considered are non-stationary (see the Annex) and therefore the use of the VECM approach is appropriate.
In the context of a model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend and three lags, as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), both the trace and maximum-eigenvalue statistics indicate only one co-integrating vector (see Table 8 ).
Maximum-Likelihood estimates of the long-run parameters are shown in Table 9 .
Contrary to the Chilean case, the Likelihood ratio test for over-identifying restrictions strongly rejects the null of a zero long-run coefficient for the tax equivalent at conventional significance levels (test statistic of 23.55). In addition to being statistically significant, the coefficient of the URR has the correct sign, indicating that changes in the URR had a direct effect towards a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, the URR seems to affect directly the real exchange rate in the long run, in the Colombian case, arguably contributing towards mitigating the real exchange rate appreciation verified until the late 1990s.
(Insert Tables 8 and 9 here).
If we consider the short-run dynamics as characterised by the error-correction model presented in Table 10 (only statistically significant variables are presented), the direct effect of the tax equivalent on the real exchange rate is not apparent. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that the model presents evidence of non-normal residuals, therefore indicating some form of misspecification, despite the fact that heterocedasticity and autocorrelation seem to be ruled out by the standard tests.
(Insert Table 10 here).
Furthermore, the coefficient for the error correction term is only significantly different from zero at the 8% level, which one can argue is adequate given the small sample size. In any case, the error correction coefficient is small, indicating a slow adjustment towards the long-run relationship. Overall, it seems that the error correction model has some important statistical shortcomings.
CONCLUSION
At this stage, we may attempt to extract some stylised facts concerning the effects of price-based capital account regulations in the countries analysed. According to our results, there is evidence that the controls on capital inflows reduced total net capital flows in the case of Chile; nevertheless, they do not seem to have affected long-term capital flows in this country. We can reject the claims found in part of the literature that the URR actually increased long-term flows (and hence there would be no statistical evidence that total net capital flows were reduced), whilst confirming the improvement in the maturity structure of external debt.
The empirical evidence for Colombia suggests that the regulations have reduced both long-term (flows with a maturity of more than one year) and total flows. This conclusion is not surprising, since medium term capital inflows were also targeted by the Colombian authorities. This result is particularly interesting as the dataset used for the analysis allows for the disaggregation of capital inflows according to their maturity, which was a major difficulty faced by the previous literature on the Colombian controls.
Our co-integration models for real exchange rates showed that, in the case of Chile, the URR did not have a direct effect on the real exchange rate either in the long run or in the short run. Therefore, the controls on inflows only contributed towards reducing an excessive real exchange rate appreciation indirectly, through their effect on total net capital inflows. The co-integration model used for Colombia did detect a direct impact of the capital account regulations on the real exchange rate, in the long run, thus suggesting that the taxes on inflows did directly reduce the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Nonetheless, one has to note that the statistical properties of the model used were not very good when addressing short-run dynamics (no significant direct effect was found in this case).
Thus, the results presented in this paper strongly reject claims that price-based capital account regulations were easily circumvented by market players and therefore were non-binding. Our distinct dataset and arguably more appropriate econometric techniques (when compared to the previous literature) indicated that the capital account policies analysed seem to have had significant macroeconomic effects on the countries studied. Therefore, one can argue that the evidence presented above confirms the effectiveness of the policies in attaining some of its objectives. Evidently, this does not mean that the relevant authorities applied those policies optimally and therefore minimised macroeconomic fragility at all times. In fact, a number of authors have emphasised failures of policy makers in the two countries to alter the capital controls when it was necessary to do so (see David, 2005 for related criticisms). i Nonetheless, it is widely recognised in the literature that after those extensions FDI became a channel for the entrance of portfolio flows, which suggests an element of mere change of labels regarding the composition of flows. Despite this fact, there is no evidence that evasion of the capital account regulations was not merely marginal. Gallego et al. (2002) estimate that in the whole 1991-1998 period the total reserve deposit implied by the URR was on average 1.9% of Chile's GDP.
ii In order to obtain a rough estimate of the importance of U.S. capital flows to Chile, consider that bank loans from the U. iv Some authors tried to take into account the fact that players in financial markets will try to evade the regulations imposed and therefore the restrictions would "loose power" some time after implemented. De Gregorio et al. (2000) and Gallego et al. (2002) constructed an index that takes the value of 1 each time a new regulation is implemented (or the scope of previous regulations extended) and decays thereafter. The rate of decay chosen is purely arbitrary in those cases. v The results reported are robust to different definitions of the tax equivalent. vi I would like to thank Professor Marcus Chambers for pointing this out to me. vii The results are qualitatively similar when only an intercept is included in the VECM and are available upon request. viii The Central Bank set the reserve requirements at 93% for 12 months deposits, 64% for 18 months deposits and 50% for 24 months deposits. ix At this stage, the holding period was equal to the maturity of the loan and the reserve requirements varied from 140% for loans with a maturity of less than one month to 42.8% for those with a 60 months maturity.
x They also use data from the foreign exchange balance; hence facing the same problem outlined previously regarding the distinction between short-term and long-term flows. xi These authors use the average of the tax equivalent for inflows with a maturity of 18, 36 and 60 months. xii Once again, in order to have a rough estimate of the importance of U.S. capital flows, note that 24.5% of total bank loans to Colombia originated in the U.S. in 1994 according to BIS data and 57.5% of Colombia's total long-term debt was denominated in U.S. dollars on average during 1990-1999 period, according to the World Bank's GDF dataset. xiii Once again, the sample period was chosen because of data availability and to avoid structural breaks. xiv The dummy was included to capture the end of the crawling band system.
